



CLOSE-UPS

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Executive Summary

In April, the international landscape was marked by numerous significant developments, particularly in Europe and the Middle East. Italy played an especially active role in foreign policy, as evidenced by Prime Minister Meloni's meetings with Donald Trump in Washington, and with JD Vance and President Erdoğan in Rome. The death and, above all, the funeral of Pope Francis further enhanced the diplomatic centrality of the Italian capital, which hosted numerous heads of state and government, with several bilateral talks taking place on the sidelines of the funeral ceremonies. Rome also hosted one of the three negotiation meetings mediated by Oman between U.S. and Iranian delegations to discuss Tehran's nuclear program. Meanwhile, Israel intensified its military operations in the Gaza Strip and southern Syria, also carrying out a series of targeted airstrikes in Yemen in response to attacks by Houthi rebels. In Africa, Haftar's forces continued to strengthen their influence in southern Libya, while Algeria experienced growing diplomatic tensions with France and with members of the Alliance of Sahel States. In the Sahel region, as well as in West Africa, there was a notable increase in jihadist-inspired terrorist attacks. On the Ukrainian front, no significant progress was recorded in the negotiations, while India and Pakistan engaged in a reciprocal missile exchange in the disputed Kashmir region.



Crisis reopens between Algiers and Paris

Algeria has announced the expulsion of twelve French diplomatic officers working at the French embassy in Algiers. The move follows the arrest, in Paris, of three Algerian nationals accused of participating in the 2024 kidnapping of Algerian influencer Ahmed Boukhors, a well-known critic of President Tebboune's government; among them was a consular official of the Algerian government. France has urged Algeria to reverse its decision or face proportional retaliatory measures.

It is the first time in the (troubled) history of relations between the two countries that Algiers has resorted to expelling a diplomatic representative, marking a significant escalation in bilateral tensions. Just last week, French Foreign Minister Barrot had met with President Abdelmadjid Tebboune in Algiers, announcing the resolution of a crisis begun in July 2024, when France officially recognized the ambitions of Morocco — Algeria's historical rival — over the strategic Western Sahara region.

Despite Algiers' staunch opposition to Morocco's annexation of Western Sahara, at the core of a nearly fifty-year dispute between the two North African nations, Tebboune had in fact adopted an unusually conciliatory tone, calling the French move a "misunderstanding" between "sovereign powers." Around the same time, Algeria lifted the trade embargo on Spain, which had also turned to Morocco's side in 2022 — a sign that Algeria was likely not willing to sacrifice high-level economic partnerships on the altar of Western Sahara.

The renewed escalation partly reflects internal political divisions in France, where Macron — whose party lost its parliamentary majority in the snap elections called last June — has become more reliant on his center-right Republican allies, whose anti-immigration stance, supported by Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau, is a constant source of friction with Algeria. As France approaches its presidential elections, the fate of bilateral relations remains uncertain.

Francesco Meriano



Haftar tightens grip on Fezzan

On April 14, a convoy from the 87th Battalion of the Libyan National Army (LNA), including heavy vehicles and a helicopter squadron, left Benghazi for southwestern Fezzan. LNA commander-in-chief Khalifa Haftar, the de facto ruler of Cyrenaica, aims to consolidate his grip on the country's southern periphery and over cross-border flows of fuel, precious minerals, and light weapons between Fezzan and the Sahel. Libya's southern borders also serve as a key channel for cooperation with the military juntas of the Alliance of Sahel States, key partners of Haftar and of the Russian forces backing him. But the marshal also maintains ties with Chad — where the LNA has supported the Déby government against armed movements hostile to N'Djamena — and with Sudanese irregulars loyal to Mohamed Dagalo.

In this context, the LNA's military build-up in Fezzan doubles as a crackdown on Nigerien, Sudanese, and Chadian rebel movements who seek to regroup across Libya's porous interior. Haftar also fears that common tribal ties between Sahelian rebels and Fezzan tribal leaders could rekindle tensions within the LNA itself. In February, an attempt to dismantle Tebu and Awlad Suleiman armed cells led to over twenty casualties in the town of al-Qatrun, following a refusal by the 128th Brigade— among the LNA's main militias in Fezzan — to lay down arms and be reassigned across Haftar's other units. During the battle, LNA forces apprehended Mahmoud Saleh, the Tebu Nigerien leader the Niger Liberation Front, who had allegedly been under the brigade's protection. The 128th Brigade is also said to include a Tebu faction loyal to ousted Chadian leader Saleh Habré, while a Sudanese group led by Minni Minawi — former governor of Darfur and bitter enemy of Dagalo's RSF — remains active in the southern edges of Fezzan. All thorns in Haftar's side, growing painful by the day.

Francesco Meriano



Washington remains aligned with Tel Aviv despite friction between Netanyahu and Trump

On Monday, April 7, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Washington for a hastily arranged meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. The main topics under discussion included the Iranian nuclear issue, the release of hostages still held in Gaza, tensions between Tel Aviv and Ankara in Syria, and the newly imposed U.S. tariffs on Israel.

President Trump made a wholly unexpected announcement: the United States would engage in direct talks with Iran regarding the nuclear issue. “Reaching an agreement,” he added, “would be preferable to what is obvious,” referring to the repeatedly threatened strikes on Iranian territory. While Trump provided no further details, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi clarified that the meetings would be held in Oman on the 12th of the month. In contrast to Trump’s statement, however, Araghchi described the talks as “indirect” and mediated by the Omanis. Following the initial meeting, two more were held—one in Rome—and a fourth is scheduled to take place in Oman in May. The U.S. was represented by Steve Witkoff, Trump’s envoy to the Middle East. The announcement was reportedly not well received by Netanyahu, who for decades has been advocating for military action against Iran, which he characterizes as a “threat to Israel’s security,” and has repeatedly expressed his intention to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. As talks between Washington and Tehran have progressed, Israel has voiced deep concern that the United States may conclude a “bad” deal and has criticized the perceived lack of information-sharing from Washington.

Another key issue discussed during the April 7 press conference was the imposition of 17% tariffs on Israeli goods on Donald Trump’s “Liberation Day.” When asked whether these tariffs might be rescinded, the U.S. president responded in a manner that was not entirely dismissive: “We will have a completely new trade system,” he stated, “so no, probably not.” He also reminded reporters that Washington already provides Israel with \$4 billion in annual aid. Netanyahu, adopting a conciliatory tone, stated that his government would work quickly to eliminate the trade deficit and commercial barriers with the United States. He also noted that Israel could serve as an example to other countries that should pursue similar reforms.



Regarding the ongoing hostage situation in Gaza, both leaders affirmed their commitment to renewed negotiations aimed at securing the hostages' release as soon as possible. Referring to a proposal to transform the Gaza Strip into the "Riviera of the Middle East," Trump characterized Gaza as a highly valuable "piece of real estate" and suggested that U.S. oversight would be beneficial. He also commented on Israel's 2005 unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, saying that the Jewish state had "given up oceanfront property," but that the move had ultimately failed to advance peace.

On the topic of tensions between Israel and Turkey in Syria, particularly in the country's south where Israeli Air Force (IAF) strikes have been concentrated, Netanyahu had reportedly hoped for a firmer stance from President Trump. However, Trump's remarks diverged significantly from expectations. The former real estate mogul described Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as "very smart" and stated that he enjoyed excellent relations with him. Trump also urged Netanyahu to "be reasonable" with Ankara and offered to mediate between the two countries.

The outcomes of the meeting appear to have fallen short of Netanyahu's expectations. Prior to the visit, the Israeli Prime Minister had emphasized that he was the first foreign leader to meet with President Trump following the announcement of tariffs. With respect to the possibility of a U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement, it is worth recalling that Netanyahu has long advocated for military action against Tehran and, in 2024, even addressed the Iranian people directly, hinting at a possible regime change. Regardless of how the meeting between the two leaders unfolded, it seems likely that any resulting turbulence in bilateral relations will be minimal, and that Washington will continue to support Tel Aviv during this particularly sensitive period.

Meanwhile, in early May, Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that if an agreement with Hamas is not reached following President Trump's Middle East visit, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will occupy Gaza and relocate the Palestinian population to the southern part of the Strip. Hamas has responded by declaring that under such circumstances, any attempt at negotiation with the Israeli state would be futile.

Anna Maria Cossiga



Italy and Türkiye: a strategic axis in the Mediterranean

The fourth inter-governmental summit between Italy and Turkey, held on Tuesday 29 April in the Roman setting of Villa Doria Pamphilj, marks a watershed in the re-definition of bilateral relations between the two countries.

The meeting concluded with a joint declaration by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, together with a Foreign-Ministry agreement aimed at boosting economic ties. Yet beyond protocol and official communiqués, the summit signals a far deeper geopolitical shift.

It seems that Rome and Ankara are building a pragmatic and very effective corridor of relations. A Mediterranean axis that could have a major impact on the entire region and beyond in the years to come. A glance at the history of Italo-Turkish relations reveals a common thread: necessity. The two capitals do not seek each other out because of ideological affinity or shared identity, but because geography demands it. Italy needs a partner able to stem migratory pressure and impose at least a modicum of order on chaotic Libya. Turkey, for its part, wants access to the manufacturing heartland of the European Union without being hamstrung by Berlin and Paris. Regional rivals, yes—but also tactical allies: the quintessence of strategic realism. Giorgia Meloni and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan embody different versions of the same imperative: not to be left on the margins of the new global balance. Italy, the EU's Mediterranean frontier, aims for an autonomous role in the region; Turkey, a de-facto non-aligned power, searches for side-lanes to strengthen its economic and military reach. Beneath the summit's surface runs a contest for control: Europe's southern frontier no longer coincides with the Greek border but with Ankara. Erdoğan knows he can open or shut the migratory "taps" with a speed no European interior minister can match, and Italy, in the absence of EU initiatives, negotiates directly. It is no surprise that the most substantive dossiers concern energy, defence and space.

Talks between Leonardo and Baykar about possible co-operation on drone production fit into a wider context: the eastern Mediterranean's growing strategic importance and Turkey's emergence as a stable, long-term interlocutor.



Even the joint bid to host the 2032 European Football Championship – seemingly a colourful footnote – carries a geopolitical subtext: normalising, through sport, relations with a country that remains only informally inside Europe’s perimeter. It is a way to bypass Franco-German hostility and build legitimacy from the bottom up, in popular culture.

The summit’s real message is not found in its final communiqués but in its very structure: an EU member state dealing on equal terms with an external state over security, industry, culture and sport. The European Union remains the primary framework, yet Italy—just as in its dealings with Algeria, Tunisia and Serbia—supplements it with a web of targeted bilateral alliances designed to respond more flexibly to regional challenges.

Meanwhile, Erdoğan cements his role as a lateral arbiter in global conflicts: aligned with neither Moscow nor Kyiv, he keeps mediation channels open and broadens his commercial and strategic influence across three continents.

The Mediterranean is back at the centre. With this summit, Rome and Ankara are sketching the outlines of an alternative Mediterranean order, driven by power politics and concrete interests. In an increasingly multipolar international arena, medium-sized capitals with strategic intelligence do not wait for the green light from Washington, Berlin or Brussels. They act.

Settimo Cerniglia

Facing the jihadist advance, the Sahelian colonels tighten their grip

While Volodymyr Zelenskyy was preparing to leave for the United States, Vladimir Putin hosted the President of Guinea-Bissau, Umaro Sissoco Embaló, at the Kremlin. The meeting between the two heads of state was the result of diplomatic efforts by Oleg Deripaska, a close friend of Vladimir Putin, and founder of RUSAL, the Russian mining and metallurgical giant. After he met with Putin, Embaló remained in Russia for an additional three days, during which he visited the Russian special forces academy in Grozny, managed by Adam Kadyrov, son of Chechen governor Ramzan Kadyrov. The content of the discussions between Putin and Embaló remains confidential, but the bilateral meeting allowed both leaders to showcase their respective narratives: Putin once again blamed the West for Africa's woes, attributing them to a neocolonial attitude, while Embaló praised the "brotherly relations" between Moscow and Bissau. Concrete developments from the meeting can be inferred from leaks within their entourages. Sources close to Embaló's office confirmed that the two leaders discussed the potential construction of railway infrastructure by Russian companies — a project aligned with Deripaska's interest in the exploration of bauxite deposits in the West African country — as well as strengthening the bilateral cooperation in the defense and energy sectors. At the same time, Embaló's interest in strengthening ties with Russia is linked to the many issues he is facing at home. The Guinean President's mandate expired last fall and elections, originally scheduled for 2024, have been postponed and according to Embaló himself, they will not take place before the end of the year. In addition, Embaló dissolved the opposition-controlled parliament two years ago, citing an alleged coup attempt. In this context, the government of Guinea-Bissau is facing mounting pressure from ECOWAS, which is calling for a return to the polls and the restoration of democratic governance. During Embaló's visit to Moscow, a delegation from the regional organization was in Bissau to draft a transition roadmap to present to the president upon his return. However, after returning from Russia, Embaló threatened to expel ECOWAS officials, who consequently ended the mission and left the country. Shortly thereafter, the president announced his intention to run in the next presidential elections — a move that is formally legitimate, considering that Embaló is still serving his first term. This suggests the emergence of a possible exchange of resources and political support between Bissau and Moscow.

This hypothesis is further reinforced by the increase in disinformation campaigns within the country — a hallmark of the Kremlin's strategy in Africa, previously deployed in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to support the rise of governments aligned with Russian interests. Bringing Guinea-Bissau into Moscow's sphere of influence would also serve the shared objective of Russia and the Sahel juntas: securing direct access to the Atlantic Ocean. In this context, the geopolitical implications of the next elections in Guinea-Bissau are growing in importance.

Luciano Pollichieni

China is back on track

Kenyan President William Ruto's recent visit to China, alongside diplomatic talks between Chinese envoy Zhang Xianghua and Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, signal a fresh push by Beijing to reassert its influence in the Horn of Africa—following a period of strained relations and regional instability. In recent years, China's ambitions in the region have faced mounting challenges. Ruto's election in Kenya, backed by an anti-establishment platform and occasionally laced with anti-China rhetoric, significantly cooled ties between Nairobi and Beijing. Meanwhile, the outbreak of civil war in Sudan disrupted China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects and hampered Sudanese oil exports due to widespread infrastructure damage caused by the ongoing conflict. Yet, China has skillfully seized recent geopolitical openings to revive its stalled initiatives. In Sudan, Ambassador Zhang's visit to Port Sudan—where he met with al-Burhan, leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)—coincided with the partial resumption of oil production in neighboring South Sudan. The meeting effectively serves as a tacit recognition of al-Burhan's leadership and lays the groundwork for restarting BRI-related development efforts in the country. Beijing is looking to leverage the SAF's current control over the Sudanese coast—territory that the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are attempting to capture through renewed offensives in Sennar and Kassala, with an eye on pushing toward the southern Red Sea region. That campaign, however, faces long odds due to the imbalance in military strength. In this context, a more active Chinese role in the Sudan conflict—including increased military support for the SAF—cannot be ruled out. Turning to Kenya, a combination of economic strain, growing domestic unrest, and uncertainty over U.S. foreign policy under the new Trump administration has brought Nairobi back into Beijing's orbit.

During Ruto's visit, several agreements were signed reaffirming Kenya's commitment to a new model of cooperation outlined at the China-Africa summit last September. Notably, the deals confirmed continued Chinese investment in BRI infrastructure projects across the country. In their joint statement, China and Kenya also reiterated their support for global free trade under WTO rules—a thinly veiled critique of the protectionist stance taken by the Trump administration, as well as of recent cuts to international aid programs. Still, Ruto may find Beijing less willing to meet his long-term expectations. In 2024, China's purchases of Kenyan public debt dropped to their lowest level in two decades.

Nairobi is hoping China will take on a greater role in its strategy to diversify creditors—a strategy already drawing interest from middle powers such as the United Arab Emirates. While not out of the question, a major shift from Beijing in the near term appears unlikely.

Luciano Pollichieni



Tajani and Bernini in Delhi to attend the India-Italy business, science and technology Forum

On 11 and 12 April, Council Vice-President and Foreign Minister Tajani and University and Research Minister Bernini, accompanied by a large delegation of representatives from companies, universities and research centres, paid an official visit to India.

Tajani met with Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar and Commerce Minister Goyal in Delhi. The talks reviewed the growing bilateral cooperation. Tajani and Jaishankar shared their satisfaction with the high-level interactions and exchanges and noted the vast potential for cooperation between India and Italy in the fields of artificial intelligence, cyber, telecommunications, digital technologies, renewable energy, biofuels, education and academic collaborations, scientific research and mobility of youth and professionals. Ministers reiterated their commitment to elevate the bilateral strategic partnership and ensure concrete results, including in relation to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) strategic initiative. In this context, India welcomed Italy's appointment of a Special Envoy for IMEC, after Minister Tajani announced the appointment of Ambassador Francesco Talò to the post.

Minister Bernini met with Indian Minister of State for Science and Technology Jitendra Singh, with whom she signed a Memorandum of Understanding to strengthen scientific cooperation between Italy and India, promoting dialogue and knowledge exchange between universities, research centres and arts education, and attended the Education, Science and Tech, Innovation Forum. Bernini also held talks with Education Minister Minister of State Sukanta Majumdar and the government's scientific advisor, whose job is to advise the Prime Minister and Cabinet on issues related to science, technology and innovation, Ajay Kumar Sood.

Tajani, Bernini, Jaishankar and Goyal then presided over the India-Italy Business, Science and Tech Forum symposium in Delhi, during which the Italian companies present met with Indian government agencies and industrial associations to discuss India's policies, objectives, incentives and projects in the sectors covered by the Forum. The event was attended by over 100 Italian companies and their Indian counterparts from four key sectors: Industry 4.0 and new technologies; infrastructure, transport and logistics; clean energy transition; and aerospace and defence. Several B2B meetings were held with the aim of forging economic and trade partnerships.



'Trade' between Italy and India 'exceeds 14 billion, but I want to do more. We are also counting on the benefits for our companies deriving from the free trade agreement between India and the European Union, which we hope will be signed soon,' Tajani said. "Italy and India are natural economic partners," in the Asian country 'there are already more than 800 Italian companies. We want to support them as best we can and, at the same time, encourage new and innovative Indian companies to invest in Italy'.

Italy and India upgraded their bilateral relations to Strategic Partnership on the occasion of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni's visit to Delhi in March 2023. During the visit, both sides agreed to collaborate in cyber security, innovation, defence, outer space, green economy, energy security and transition, defence coproduction and co-innovation and blue economy. Last November, in a meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro, President Meloni and Indian Prime Minister Modi announced the Joint Strategic Plan 2025-2029, which outlines cooperation in areas such as defence, clean energy, digitalisation and critical minerals.

Beatrice Arborio Mella

Greenland

“The United States will take control of Greenland, one way or another”: President Trump’s recent declaration has unsettled the world’s largest Atlantic Island, now at the center of complex dynamics that are contributing to the redefinition of the global geopolitical landscape, turning the Arctic into a new arena of international competition.

Greenland is endowed with abundant rare earth resources and holds a highly strategic position in the Arctic, especially in the context of climate change. As polar ice continues to melt, the northernmost latitudes have acquired growing geopolitical relevance—not only as new sites for the exploration and extraction of traditional energy resources and critical minerals emerge, but also as new navigable sea routes begin to take shape. These routes are expected to significantly reduce travel distances between East Asia and the Atlantic.

Political and military influence over Greenland thus falls within a broader range of interests that encompass both economic and geopolitical dimensions which global and regional powers cannot overlook. It is estimated that beneath Greenland’s ice sheet lie vast reserves of hydrocarbons—particularly oil and natural gas—which could potentially reshape the global energy landscape. The island is also believed to contain significant quantities of rare earth elements—crucial for the production of electronics and advanced technologies—as well as uranium and valuable minerals such as gold, diamonds, and zinc. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, Greenland could surpass China in rare earth production within a few years, becoming a key player in the global market. Indeed, Nuuk possesses 25 of the 34 critical minerals identified by the European Commission. Nevertheless, extraction remains highly challenging due to the harsh climate, lack of infrastructure, a ban on uranium mining, and a moratorium on oil and gas exploration licenses.

For the United States, Greenland represents a strategic outpost for military surveillance and missile defense systems. It is a vital node for naval and submarine traffic in the North Atlantic, a natural shield against long-range conventional and nuclear attacks, and a linchpin in the future control of Arctic maritime routes which, by mid-century, are expected to become navigable year-round. The **Northern Sea Route (NSR)** and the **Northwest Passage**, offering significantly shorter transit times, are emerging as alternative maritime corridors to traditional routes, thereby reshaping global trade dynamics—particularly in light of recent disruptions to key chokepoints such as the Suez and Panama canals. These new trade routes are likely to benefit Russia and China, concurrently sidelining traditional routes via the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean, which would thus play a diminished role in Atlantic-Indo-Pacific trade.

For Mediterranean-facing European countries, this scenario underscores the need to diversify commercial routes, with initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)—strategically advantageous for Italy given its peninsular geography.

At present, Greenland remains economically dependent on the Danish government, which retains authority over foreign affairs and defense. Copenhagen has allocated \$400 million to bolster Arctic and North Atlantic security, enhancing surveillance and intelligence capabilities through the deployment of long-range drones, in line with the joint EU-NATO Arctic strategy.

Europe, for its part, considers the island part of its "Overseas Countries and Territories" and a potential source of access to mineral and rare earth resources. In 2023, the EU signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Greenlandic government to establish a strategic partnership aimed at developing a sustainable rare earth value chain, including the opening of an EU representative office on the island. Trump's remarks may prompt greater European political involvement in support of the government in Nuuk, particularly in defense of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. While Greenland has long aspired to independence, it will be essential to devise a strategy that prevents an untimely secession—one that could facilitate assertive U.S. actions. It is plausible, however, that the U.S.'s real objective is to negotiate favorable terms for the deployment of American military infrastructure on the island. This move would be a response to Russian efforts in support of Greenlandic independence and aimed at countering U.S. presence—activities that have triggered heightened alert levels within American intelligence and defense sectors and have prompted Washington to actively support Inuit self-determination as a counterbalance.

Russia's principal concerns lie with the expanding NATO presence in the region. The accession of Sweden and Finland—triggered by the invasion of Ukraine—has redrawn the strategic map of the Arctic, extending NATO's reach to the doorstep of Arctic Russia and leading President Putin to view the region as a potential logistical and military platform for confrontation with the West. This perception has fueled the Sino-Russian agreement on joint Arctic coastal patrols. Russia has heavily militarized the region, deploying advanced missile systems, constructing nuclear-powered icebreakers, and modernizing its Arctic bases. For the Kremlin, the Arctic is a vital asset for both economic prosperity and military security: 20% of its GDP and 30% of its exports derive from Arctic resources. Moscow has emphasized the importance of the Northern Sea Route, which it sees as a future backbone of freight transport and has earmarked \$19 billion in infrastructure investments as part of its 2035 Arctic development plan.

It is evident that the United States' ambitions in Greenland are driven by national security priorities and reflect a competitive stance—particularly with respect to China, which, despite its geographical distance, has declared itself a “near-Arctic state.” Consistent with its traditional economic penetration strategy, Beijing has sought to consolidate its presence in the region. China views the Arctic as an extension of the Belt and Road Initiative—through its “Polar Silk Road”—and has articulated its intentions in the China Arctic Policy white paper, which affirms the country’s economic and scientific interests in the region. China’s Arctic policy aims to secure energy resources and diversify trade routes, enabling it to bypass the Strait of Malacca—through which a significant share of its trade flows—thus reducing dependence on U.S.-controlled maritime corridors.

Within this context, Canada has intensified its military presence and diplomatic engagement in the region. Ottawa regards the Northwest Passage as part of its territorial waters and has developed coastal infrastructure to support monitoring, research, emergency response, and port operations. The country has expanded its coast guard presence, satellite coverage, and drone operations, and has worked in close collaboration with Inuit communities. Under the strategic plan of Joint Task Force North, Canada also envisions the deployment of new patrol vessels, destroyers, icebreakers, submarines, and aircraft.

This evolving geopolitical competition in the Arctic is likely to reverberate across ASEAN countries as well, shaping the economic outlook, regional security dynamics, and diplomatic relations. The accelerated exploitation of Arctic resources and the emergence of new maritime routes may alter established trade patterns, disrupt traditional supply chains, and diminish the strategic importance of the Strait of Malacca as a global commercial gateway.

Alessandra Ruggeri and Grethel Mondello – Leonardo International