In the context of the war in Sudan, General Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have tightened their grip on El-Fasher. As capital of Western Darfur, this city holds significant strategic and symbolic importance in the ongoing conflict. Strategically, ElFasher represents the last stronghold in the region still under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Its capture would grant Hemedti’s paramilitary forces control over the entire region, potentially allowing them to establish an autonomous geopolitical entity. According to some sources, seizing the region would also strengthen the RSF’s logistics chain, securing supply lines from eastern Libya and Chad. Symbolically, El-Fasher was the epicenter of the Darfur genocide, and the international community fears that its recapture could lead to renewed ethnic cleansing. The RSF’s tactics in their bid to take the city leave little doubt in this regard. Bombardments of healthcare facilities have become constant, and the suffering of the civilian population has prompted the UN Security Council to pass a resolution calling for a humanitarian ceasefire amid the offensive. Despite the dire news from El-Fasher, the regular armed forces do not appear to be focusing their efforts on retaking Darfur at the moment. Instead, the SAF continues to mobilize the bulk of its men and equipment towards the city of Omdurman, the main route to recapturing the capital, Khartoum. Al-Burhan’s plans hinge on this move to ensure the total recognition of the Sovereign Council as the only legitimate government of the country. In this context, the regular forces aim to capitalize on the Russian arms supplies expected to arrive at Port Sudan in the coming weeks, following an agreement with Moscow for the use of a port on the Red Sea. Meanwhile, the UN has officially recognized Sudan as an area affected by a major food crisis. June also saw significant protests in Kenya. After weeks of demonstrations against the government of William Ruto, the toll includes more than 200 arrests, 24 deaths, and dozens of injuries. The protests, led by Kenyan Gen Z, called for the cancellation of the financial bill proposed by Ruto’s government, which included substantial tax increases, including those on fuel and digital transactions. The demonstrations culminated in an assault on the Kenyan parliament on June 25, when protesters broke through police security and occupied parts of the building for several hours before being evicted. The protests were met with widespread violence by law enforcement, who in some cases opened fire on the crowd, drawing harsh condemnation from the international community. In this context, the Kenyan judiciary has taken a stand against the use of force by the police, opening several investigations into the security forces. In response to the protests, Ruto initially sought to calm the situation by acknowledging the reasons behind the demonstrations and expressing his willingness to work with his opponents. However, he later described the protesters as wealthy, bored youths or even criminals. The president then deployed the army to defend key state buildings, while the international community, led by the USA, pressured the government to stop the violent repression of the protests and listen to the people’s grievances. Ruto eventually withdrew the financial bill, leaving the public finance dilemma unresolved. Given the current state of Kenya’s finances, the government will need to find additional liquidity for the treasury, a crucial prerequisite for unlocking International Monetary Fund aid. Meanwhile, the mobilization continues, with protesters, emboldened by the withdrawal of the budget bill, now calling for the president’s resignation.
Download the June 2024 reportFrom Iran’s assertiveness to tensions between actors in the Horn of Africa, via piracy and terrorism: the role of the strategic straits in the new instability of the Gulf-Red Sea quadrant.
From the protection of maritime trade to the stability of the Horn of Africa: the importance of Djibouti’s military facilities for Mediterranean and European security.
Head of state | Ismail Omar Guelleh |
Head of Government | Abdoulkader Kamil Mohamed |
Institutional Form | Semi-presidential Republic |
Capital | Djibouti City |
Legislative Power | Unicameral Legislative Assembly (65 Members of Parliament elected every year) |
Judicial Power | Supreme Court; Constitutional Council |
Ambassador to Italy | Ayeid Mousseid Yahya (Ambassador in France, also responsible for Italy) |
Total Area kmq | 23,300 km2 |
Land | 22.980 km2 |
Weather | Tropical-desert climate on the coast and in the north of the country, and semi-desert on the central-southern heights |
Natural resources | geothermal energy, gold, clay, marble, limestone, granite, salt, plaster, diatomaceous earth, pumice, oil |
Economic summary | The main resources of economy are imports and the service activities connected to the strategic position of the Djiboutian port on the Red Sea. Unemployment rate: 40%. Youth unemployment rate: about 80% |
GDP | $3.37 billion (December 2021) |
Pro-capite GDP (Purchasing power parity) | $5.394 (December 2021) |
Exports | $4.94 billion (DJF 2020/2021) |
Export partner | Ethiopia 31.3%, China 27.5%, India 10%, Saudi Arabia 9.98%, Egypt 3.2%, UK 3.8%, South Korea 2.8%, UAE 1.5%, Malaysia 1.9% (2020) |
Imports | $5.37 billion (DJF 2020/2021) |
Import partner | China 43%, UAE 14%, India 6.2%, Türkiye 5.9%, Morocco 4.6%, Indonesia 3.6%, Japan 1.8% (2020) |
Trade With Italy | $18,9 million (2020) |
Population | 957.273 (2022) |
Population Growth | +1.97 (2022 est.) |
Ethnicities | Somali 60%, Afar 35%, other groups 5% (especially Yemenis, French, Ethiopians and Italians) |
Languages | French and Arabic |
Religions | Islam 94% and Christianity 6% (foreigner residents) |
Urbanization | 78.4% |
Literacy | 70% |
Independent since 1977, Djibouti is a small and semi-desertic country. Located in East Africa, it borders with Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somaliland. With a population of over 900,000 inhabitants, its official languages are Arabic and French.
Its strategic position on the Bab el Mandeb Strait, which separates the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden, allows it not only to operate as a key logistics hub for international trade, but also to play an important role for security in the region. The country hosts various foreign military bases, including an Italian one.
Total trade with Italy amounts to $18.9 million (2021). In 2020, Djibouti signed a military cooperation agreement with Italy. The treaty sets several objectives directly affecting Italy and security in the broader Mediterranean, such as the strengthening of mutual defensive capabilities, the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa and the development of the supply and logistics sectors of both countries. Other areas of cooperation include humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, the organisation of Djiboutian armed forces, military training and military health.