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DRC-Rwanda: peace walks on a tightrope
International efforts to bring peace to Eastern Congo are bearing fruits. The analysis by Corrado Čok
International efforts to bring peace to Eastern Congo are bearing fruits. The Qatari and US mediations have made impressive strides in recent months, paving the way to preliminary agreements between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and between the DRC and the main rebel group fighting against it in the east: the M23. But Congo’s protracted crisis is still far from solved and continues to threaten the stability of the broader Great Lakes region.
The conflict in Eastern Congo reignited in late 2023, when the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group began to capture territory across the strategic, mineral-rich province of North Kivu. The M23 stems from the Tutsi communities of eastern Congo and claims to protect their rights from the threats of other ethnic groups, including Hutu movements responsible for the 1994 Rwanda genocide. In January 2025, the resurgence of M23 culminated in the group’s takeover of Goma, the capital of North Kivu and largest city in the eastern DRC. In February and March, M23, along with some estimated 3-4,000 Rwandan troops and military supplies, advanced further in all directions and set up local administrations in conquered territories. This advance reached key coltan mines and mineral transport routes. The smuggling of minerals is a primary source of revenue for the M23 and other armed groups that operate in eastern Congo.
The Congolese army and its allied militias – the Voluntaires pour la Defence de la Patrie (VDP) or wazalendo – struggled to contain the M23 advance due to long-standing inefficiencies, corruption, poor resources and lack of coordination. The Congolese front suffered another blow when Burundian troops and the South Africa-led peacekeeping mission - deployed in support of Kinshasa - announced their withdrawal in February and March respectively. Since January 2024, the number of Congolese refugees has increased by over 10%, and internally displaced persons reached an all-time high of 7.3 million, according to the UN agency for refugees (UNHCR). These staggering figures make this the world’s second largest humanitarian crisis after Sudan.
However, a series of internationally-mediated agreements have partly mitigated the crisis. On March 18th, DRC President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame agreed on an immediate ceasefire in Qatar, which significantly decreased the involvement of the Congolese and Rwandan armies in the conflict. In late April, the Qatari mediation made another step forward by brokering a preliminary deal between the DRC and M23. This breakthrough is remarkable since the Congolese government had long refused to sit at the table with the Rwanda-backed rebel group. The DRC-M23 table has been extended to the other main mediators, namely Togo, which took over the African Union’s mediation track from Angola, and France, which has stakes in the region and a deep security partnership with Rwanda. Both negotiations continue in pursuit of comprehensive peace agreements.
The DRC-Rwanda negotiation, meanwhile, has moved to Washington. Under the auspices of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the Congolese and Rwandan foreign ministers signed a declaration committing them to reach a comprehensive peace deal, recognize each other’s sovereignty and security concerns, and interrupt any support to non-state armed groups. The US is spinning the peace agreement through bilateral economic deals that include large US investment pledges in several sectors, such as infrastructure, hydropower and, most notably, critical minerals. Washington has been in talks for months to secure mining deals from the parties, as the US tries to partly wrestle control of strategic mineral resources from China and build its own supply chain. Yet, the level of US commitment to regional security remains unclear, as is the risk appetite of potential American investors.
While it creates room for optimism, this breakthrough needs to be taken with a pinch of salt for a number of reasons. Eastern Congo has a long history of broken truces that traces back to the First Congo War of the late 1990s. After signing the declaration in Washington, the Congolese foreign minister stated that this was just a first step on a long path to peace. On May 5th, Kinshasa and Kigali reportedly submitted two draft agreements to the US that should translate into a full peace accord by end of May, though distrust among the parties has not faded away.
But the most challenging ground remains the negotiation between the Congolese government and the M23, as their preliminary agreement did not put an end to the fighting. VDP armed groups and the M23 continue to engage in armed clashes that, at times, involved the Congolese army too. Despite serious financial and security hurdles, M23 has recently conquered several villages in North and South Kivu and while DRC-M23 negotiations are still on track, these military actions complicate the prospects for a comprehensive deal.
Then, a long-term political agreement between the DRC and the M23 will most likely require some difficult and unpalatable concessions on power-sharing to the rebel group within local and, possibly, central government. But the political climate in Kinshasa might not be conducive for it, as the crisis has weakened President Tshisekedi’s position. Key opposition leaders have turned down the president’s proposal for a government of national unity and the political return of his predecessor, Joseph Kabila, further challenges his presidency.
Another problem comes with the nature of these armed groups. If the M23 depends substantially on Rwanda for its war effort, the VDP is a loose coalition of armed groups that have challenged the decisions of the Congolese government on several occasions and rejected the talks between Tshisekedi and Kagame. This makes it harder to Congolese authorities to pressure their allied militias into a peace deal. As a result, if the war between the M23 and VDP carries on, some high risk remains that shifts on the ground drag the Congolese and Rwandan armies back into direct fight.
Besides the local dimension, the conflict has wider implications that affect the Great Lakes region and the broader continent. Burundi, which hosts a Tutsi minority, is deeply concerned with the M23 expansion next to its border with the DRC and fears a Rwanda-led incursion in its territory. Uganda has meanwhile expanded its military deployment in Eastern Congo’s Ituri province and tries to balance its relations between the DRC and Rwanda/M23. Key countries of the Southern Africa Development Community support Kinshasa, with South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania having already sent troops through the regional peacekeeping mission. If a new escalation occurred, these and other countries of the region could (re)enter the conflict, as happened during the Second Congo War (1998-2003), when eight African nations intervened in the DRC.
As the global system looks increasingly anarchic and mediation efforts left to the initiatives of individual states, disincentives to the use of military force lessen and external players find themselves more comfortable resorting to it, as seen with Rwanda. Meanwhile, gold prices are steadily going up, and the value of key critical minerals is expected to rise too as technological and geopolitical trends push advanced economies to develop their mineral value chains against China’s sector dominance. The bottom line is that minerals generate growing economic incentives to control areas of Eastern Congo among local and external actors.
The preliminary agreements and partial de-escalation that ensued from Doha and Washington are a rare opportunity to stabilize the eastern DRC, at least temporarily. As peace still walks on a tightrope, the international community, especially Europe, is called on to support these mediation efforts with concrete incentives for peace and clear disincentives to walking out the talks.
