Libya

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Libya: monthly report February 2024

The mediation work of the UN special envoy and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Abdoulaye Bathily, continues. On 15 February, he held a hearing at the Security Council to take stock of the current situation in the country. Specifically, the UNSMIL head stated that “Libya’s main institutional actors do not seem willing to resolve the outstanding issues”. Despite the 6+6 Joint Committee, composed of members of both the House of Representatives (HoR) and the High Council of State (HCS), finalized in 2023 “the constitutional and legal framework for the elections” none of the five stakeholders – the Presidential Council (PC), the two chambers, the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) – have “made a decisive move from their initial position, with each continuing to articulate pre-conditions for their participation in the dialogue as a way to maintain the status quo”: the speaker of the HoR, Aguila Saleh, conditioned his presence on the formation of a new government, demanding that either the two cabinets – GNU and the Government of National Stability (GNS) – are included or excluded altogether; the HCS president, Mohamed Takala, maintained “his rejection of the electoral laws as published by the HoR, demanding to revert to the draft agreed upon by the 6+6 Joint Committee in Bouznika”; the GNU premier, Abdul Hamid Dbeiba insists that he “will only step down after the holding of elections, meaning that the Government of National Unity that he chairs will supervise the coming electoral process”; the LNA commander, Khalifa Haftar, has conditioned the GNU’s presence on the inclusion of the GNS. Alternatively, Haftar would agree to participate if both governments are excluded; finally, the president of the Presidential Council, Mohammed Menfi, “does not want to be seen as a party but is prepared to act as a facilitator to support” the UN initiative. By also making it clear that there is a delicate security balance between the individual actors in the country, Bathily went on to emphasize the frustration of a large part of civil society over “the inability of their authorities to lead Libya towards peace, stability and progress”, especially because of the “failure to approve a budget for public spending” – which only exacerbates the lack of “transparency with respect to the management of resources and the unequal distribution of the country’s wealth”. Finally, the UN envoy expressed concern about the order issued by the SNG to eleven local offices of the High Electoral Commission, which were allegedly ordered to suspend their activities. In this regard, in the days immediately following the Security Council intervention, the head of UNSMIL was declared persona non grata by the Government of National Stability – the cabinet based in Sirte and not recognized by the international community. In February, the GNS also issued a directive to foreign organizations operating in the field of migration in Libya, requiring these actors to be accredited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the government appointed by the House of Representatives (HoR), in order to continue working in the country. The Minister for Irregular Migration, Fathi Al-Tabawi, asked the organizations to submit within 10 days a report on their activities for the year 2023, containing all their projects, programmes and work strategy for the year 2024, stating further that “actors who do not adhere to these instructions risk having their work in Libyan territory suspended”.

February was a busy month for the Libyan authorities. PC president Menfi met in Cairo with his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. The focus of the bilateral was the common will to strengthen cooperation in several areas, in particular politics and security. Al-Sisi underlined his country’s full support for the PC president in heading the way to “reach a political solution” leading to “free and fair elections that meet the aspirations of the Libyan people”. Subsequently, Menfi attended the meeting of the African Union High Level Committee on Libya, held in Brazzaville, and the 37th ordinary session of the AU Assembly, held in Addis Ababa. On the sidelines of the meetings, the PC president also held talks with several counterparts, heads of Government and Foreign Ministers from the African continent, with whom were discussed issues of bilateral interest. Also worth mentioning the Libyan mediation’s attempt with regard to the crisis in Sudan: Menfi received Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan in Tripoli together with Dbeiba, after the latter in the same days had a telephone conversation with Mohamed Dagalo “Hemedti”.

Similarly, GNU Premier and Defence Minister Dbeiba had a series of important talks with partners in the Middle East. After attending the second ministerial meeting of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) in Riyadh, the prime minister attended the 2024 World Governments Summit in Dubai. On that occasion, Dbeiba held talks with UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed, who reportedly confirmed the UAE’s support for the National Unity Government and readiness to sustain any dialogue aimed at ending the transitional phases through elections. On the sidelines of the event, the GNU premier then met with the President of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as well as several heads of state and government and top representatives of some international organizations attending the summit. The meeting with Erdoğan discussed the political situation in Libya, the latest developments in the region and ways to strengthen bilateral economic cooperation. The Turkish president reiterated his readiness to support “any dialogue that leads to the stability in Libya and holding elections without new transitional phases”, also pointing out that the GNU is “the only legitimate government that the World and Türkiye have to deal with”.

It is finally important to highlight the activities of the Russian Federation in the country. On 22 February, in Tripoli was held a ceremony for the official reopening of the Russian embassy, and the ambassador, Aydar Aghanin, announced that a consulate general in Benghazi is also due to be opened in 2024. These events are part of Moscow’s broader operations in Libya: according to recent rumours, in addition to reinforcing the deployment of the Africa Corps – the Russian mercenary company created following the elimination of the commander of the Wagner Group, Prigožin – the Kremlin has also sent in the country large quantities of heavy military equipment. In particular, the areas under the control of Khalifa Haftar represent a fundamental logistical and strategic asset for Russia’s military projection in Africa, especially due to the porosity of its southern borders and its central geographic position for both the Mediterranean and the rest of the African continent. It is no coincidence that, in recent months, Haftar had met several times with the Russian Deputy Defence Minister, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, with whom was also discussed the creation of a Russian naval military facility in Cyrenaica.

Download the February 2024 report

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