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The Houthi Advance and the Strategic Significance of Bab al-Mandab
The article by Emanuele Rossi
The Houthis’ recent advance along Yemen’s western coast has altered the military balance of the conflict and strengthened the movement’s position in the Red Sea. The capture of Mokha, Dhabab and Perim Island has brought Houthi forces into control of key positions on the Yemeni side of the Bab al-Mandab, the strait connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The offensive also comes as Iranian pressure around the Strait of Hormuz has increased the importance of alternative routes for Gulf energy exports.
The significance of the advance extends beyond the territory seized. Over recent years, the Houthis have developed a more sophisticated arsenal, expanded their supply networks and become increasingly capable of combining externally sourced technology with local production and adaptation. Missiles, drones and uncrewed maritime systems had already allowed the movement to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea without controlling the Bab al-Mandab itself. The latest territorial gains bring these capabilities closer to a geography particularly suited to their use.
This has implications for the security of the wider Indo-Mediterranean corridor connecting the Indo-Pacific to the Mediterranean, and ultimately Asia to Europe. Control of the coast has not given the Houthis the ability to threaten navigation; they already possessed the means to do so. Territorial control instead strengthens a coercive capability built over several years, broadening the movement’s options and further embedding the Yemeni conflict within regional security dynamics.
A more mature military capability
The fall of Mokha provides an indication of the Houthis’ military evolution. Missiles and drones were used to disable the port ahead of the ground advance, helping Houthi forces overcome government units that were, at least in principle, better equipped.
This reflects a process that accelerated during the period of relative calm following the 2022 truce. The reduction in fighting allowed the movement to replenish its arsenals, reorganise its forces and improve its ability to assemble and adapt systems locally. Neither the recent US bombing campaign nor the Israeli strikes launched in response to Houthi missile and drone attacks since 7 October 2023 appear to have durably degraded the movement’s ability to regenerate its arsenal. These operations have targeted weapons systems, storage facilities and military infrastructure, but have not prevented the Houthis from replenishing and further developing their capabilities or disrupted the supply networks that sustain them. The resilience of these networks, combined with a growing capacity for local assembly and adaptation, helps explain the movement’s ability to sustain a new offensive on this scale.
Iranian support remains important, particularly for more sophisticated technologies, but it now combines with commercial and dual-use components, more diversified supply networks and a growing body of technical expertise. Artificial intelligence is beginning to feature in this trajectory.
In early September, Anthropic reported that it had identified a cell operating in northern Yemen that was using Claude Code to develop guidance, navigation and control software for weapons systems. The company did not formally attribute the activity to the Houthis. There is no evidence that this work contributed to the current offensive or resulted in operational systems. The case nevertheless illustrates how commercial technology, open-source software and frontier AI models could facilitate programming, simulation and systems integration tasks that would otherwise require specialised expertise.
For an actor that already possesses hardware, infrastructure and operational experience, such technologies could increase its capacity to absorb, adapt and build upon external assistance.
The strategic significance of Bab al-Mandab
The advance towards Bab al-Mandab should be understood against this broader trajectory of military development. The strait is one of the major passages in the global maritime system. According to UNCTAD data for 2023, around 8.7 per cent of global seaborne trade passed through it, with considerably higher shares for containers, vehicles and energy products. Its position connects the Indian Ocean directly to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. A major disruption to this Indo-Mediterranean route would force vessels travelling between Asia and Europe to divert around Africa, increasing both transit times and costs.
Since 2023, the Houthis have already demonstrated their ability to affect this system without exercising territorial control over the strait. Attacks on commercial shipping have altered the calculations of shipping companies and prompted a sustained international naval presence. The significance of the latest territorial gains therefore lies less in the acquisition of an entirely new interdiction capability than in the conditions under which an existing one can be employed.
Control of Perim and additional stretches of coastline increases the movement’s operational depth and coercive options. In strictly military terms, control of Bab al-Mandab may add relatively little to the Houthis’ ability to disrupt shipping, since missiles and drones already allowed them to do so from territory further inland and along the Red Sea coast. Its significance lies in the ability to operate from positions directly adjacent to the chokepoint and in the political value attached to physical control over such a strategically important location.
The relevant concept is therefore sea denial rather than sea control. The Houthis lack the capabilities to exercise conventional control over the Red Sea, while the United States and its European and regional partners retain overwhelming naval and air superiority. Yet control of the sea is not required to generate tactical effects with strategic consequences. Making transit sufficiently dangerous, costly or unpredictable can alter commercial behaviour, raise insurance premiums and force adversaries to commit substantial resources to protecting navigation.
This asymmetry helps explain the Houthis’ growing relevance. An armed movement without a conventional navy can still affect the maritime system connecting the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Security at Bab al-Mandab therefore has direct implications for Suez, Eurasian trade routes, energy flows and the resilience of European supply chains. From this perspective, the Red Sea cannot be treated as strategically separate from the Mediterranean.
The Houthis and Iran
The Houthis’ new position also has immediate implications for Iran. Pressure around Bab al-Mandab comes as the Strait of Hormuz is already at the centre of confrontation between Tehran and Washington, increasing the overall vulnerability of regional energy routes. The simultaneous exposure of Saudi Arabia’s overland energy infrastructure, illustrated by the recent attack on the East-West Pipeline, also affects the value of alternatives designed to bypass maritime chokepoints.
These developments increase Tehran’s leverage but do not necessarily imply direct Iranian control over Houthi decision-making. The current offensive also serves the movement’s own objectives: consolidating its position inside Yemen, weakening government forces and increasing pressure on Saudi Arabia. The degree of operational coordination with Tehran remains an important variable, but it does not fully account for Houthi motivations.
Iranian and Houthi interests can converge without their priorities being identical or every operation being directed through an Iranian chain of command. At the same time, the Houthis’ growing ability to produce, adapt and operate some systems with greater autonomy may increase their strategic value to Iran. A partner capable of sustaining more of its own operations requires less direct assistance to exert pressure on shared adversaries.
The relationship has therefore become more complex than the conventional proxy label suggests. Iranian support remains important, particularly for technologically sophisticated capabilities, while the Houthis retain their own objectives, a consolidated territorial base and growing scope for independent action. Their strategic relevance stems in part from the interaction between these factors.
Implications for regional security
The advance along Yemen’s western coast raises an immediate challenge for maritime security. Naval missions remain necessary to protect commercial traffic and keep shipping routes open, but they address the final stage of a broader system. Houthi military capabilities are sustained by transnational supply networks, technology transfers, local production and territorial control. A strategy focused primarily on intercepting missiles and drones therefore risks leaving many of the conditions that allow the movement to regenerate its capabilities intact.
For regional and European actors, this points towards a broader approach to Red Sea security. This would include better intelligence on supply networks, stronger efforts to interdict military and dual-use transfers, deeper cooperation with countries in the Horn of Africa, protection of energy and port infrastructure, and greater capacity among regional partners. The domestic Yemeni dimension cannot be separated from these efforts. As long as the Houthis retain a sufficiently large and stable territorial base, maritime military pressure alone is unlikely to remove their ability to regenerate the threat.
The issue also concerns the architecture of international military presence in the region. The United States, France, Italy, Japan and China all maintain military facilities in Djibouti, across the strait from Yemen. Bab al-Mandab’s growing importance places a premium on the ability to combine deterrence, protection of navigation and escalation management in a theatre where several external powers already operate in close proximity.
The Houthis’ evolution also raises a broader question about the diffusion of military capability. Iranian technology, commercial components, open-source software, local production, accumulated operational experience and transnational networks are expanding the range of capabilities available to a non-state armed actor. The potential use of AI for engineering tasks fits within this trend by lowering some of the constraints associated with access to specialised technical expertise.
This does not amount to a convergence between state and non-state military power. The Houthis remain dependent on external sources for critical technologies and lack many of the military, industrial and financial resources available to states. Their evolution nevertheless shows how an entrenched armed organisation, supported by a state partner and able to exploit commercially available technologies, can generate strategic effects disproportionate to the resources it commits.
Bab al-Mandab makes this development particularly visible. The geography of the strait amplifies capabilities that the Houthis have built over several years, allowing them to affect economic and security interests far beyond Yemen. The significance of the current advance therefore extends beyond the outcome of the ground campaign. It illustrates the growing ability of a non-state armed actor to translate territorial entrenchment, technological adaptation and regional connections into sustained influence over the maritime system linking the Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.
