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Sanae Takaichi and Japan’s New Strategic Cycle
Political Mandate, Structural Constraints, and Systemic Choices: Japan’s Political Turning Point After Sanae Takaichi’s Victory. By Emanuele Rossi
Sanae Takaichi’s electoral victory marks a profound departure in Japan’s postwar political history. Less than four months after becoming the country’s first female prime minister, she led the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to its largest-ever majority in the House of Representatives in the snap election held on February 8. This was not merely a party triumph, but an unprecedented personal mandate—surpassing even that once secured by her political mentor, the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, architect of the now globally recognized concept of the “Indo-Pacific.” In a system traditionally characterized by short-lived leadership and strong intra-party dynamics, this result provides Takaichi with rare political capital, inaugurating a new cycle—while simultaneously raising the stakes.
The first indication of the direction the Prime Minister intends to set came swiftly. Within hours of the electoral outcome, Takaichi announced her intention to initiate the process of revising the 1947 Constitution, drafted during the U.S. occupation of Japan. Constitutional reform has been a founding mission of the LDP since 1955 and constitutes a common thread linking the current leadership to Abe’s political legacy. In this sense, Takaichi views her electoral victory not as an endpoint, but as a historic window of opportunity.
Yet the symbolic and political significance of constitutional reform should not obscure its structural constraints. Amending Japan’s fundamental charter involves deliberately high thresholds: a two-thirds majority in both chambers of the Diet and final approval through a national referendum—an instrument Japan has never employed. Although the ruling coalition now commands a supermajority in the lower house, control of the upper house remains out of reach, necessitating negotiations with opposition forces. Meanwhile, public opinion surveys have long reflected an increasingly ambivalent stance toward the Constitution: widely respected as a pillar of national identity, yet viewed by a growing segment of the population as no longer fully suited to contemporary challenges—a factor that may work in Takaichi’s favor.
The most sensitive and symbolic issue remains Article 9, the so-called “pacifist clause.” Although progressively reinterpreted to permit the existence of the Self-Defense Forces, a defense industry, and limited forms of collective self-defense, it continues to represent a cornerstone of postwar Japanese identity. In an increasingly unstable international environment, a formal revision of Article 9 appears politically more legitimate today than at previous junctures and potentially acceptable to a range of international actors, particularly among Tokyo’s allies and strategic partners. This would not, however, preclude strong instrumentalization of the process by countries such as China and North Korea, which would likely portray it as a return to militarization. Domestically, such a change would grant greater political and legal legitimacy to Japan’s military instrument, but could also trigger public and political debate—susceptible to exploitation by opposition forces. In this context, a gradual approach—such as explicitly recognizing the Self-Defense Forces in the Constitution or pursuing targeted, less polarizing amendments—may prove the most sustainable course in the short term.
On the strategic and geopolitical front—closely intertwined with constitutional reform—Takaichi appears broadly aligned with the trajectory set by Abe, albeit with potentially greater assertiveness, enabled by her renewed political mandate. The concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) remains the cornerstone of Japan’s external posture, not merely as a diplomatic framework but as a comprehensive strategic construct integrating maritime security, supply chain resilience, technological cooperation, and regional deterrence. Within this framework, strengthening the alliance with the United States and deepening cooperation with key partners such as India (and Italy, not least given the friendship between Takaichi and Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni) acquires structural significance, aimed at rebalancing power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific without sliding into direct confrontation.
Relations with China remain the principal strategic variable—and the main political multiplier—of Takaichi’s new course. Her decisive electoral victory has effectively muted domestic opposition to a more robust security posture, expanding the political space for strengthening Japan’s deterrent capabilities, particularly in the event of a Taiwan contingency. The Prime Minister’s statements regarding the possibility of a Japanese military response should Chinese action against the island directly threaten Japanese territory have heightened tensions with Beijing, yet have not entailed significant domestic political costs—suggesting a greater public readiness to accept more explicit security language.
China’s response, marked by accusations of a supposed return to militarism and accompanied by selective economic pressure, reflects the People’s Republic’s tendency to interpret Japanese security policy through a historical and ideological lens. In this context, Takaichi’s posture appears oriented toward building credible deterrence while remaining open to dialogue—provided it is anchored in the protection of national interests. For Tokyo, the central challenge lies in calibrating relations with Beijing along a delicate balance between strategic firmness and escalation management, amid persistent economic interdependence and growing structural uncertainty within China itself. By contrast, the United States and an increasing number of regional partners tend to interpret Japan’s evolving posture as a necessary contribution to regional stability, consistent with a broader redistribution of security burdens.
In this environment, the economic and financial dimension plays an instrumental role in advancing strategic objectives and maintaining domestic equilibrium. The positive market reaction to the electoral outcome primarily reflects expectations of stability and policy continuity. Nevertheless, preserving fiscal credibility and ensuring coordination with monetary policy remain essential, particularly as Japan moves decisively beyond its longstanding deflationary regime. Public debt management, investor communication, and respect for the independence of the Bank of Japan constitute enabling conditions for sustaining—rather than undermining—the government’s strategic agenda.
Finally, this new political cycle unfolds against the backdrop of long-term structural challenges—demographics, labor force constraints, the role of women, and immigration—that directly affect Japan’s power projection and national resilience. Overly restrictive migration policies may address short-term political considerations, but risk weakening Japan’s capacity to sustain growing strategic ambitions over the medium to long term in an era of systemic competition.
In conclusion, Sanae Takaichi’s victory opens a phase of extraordinary opportunity for Japan, while simultaneously heightening the need for prudent decision-making. Her mandate combines political stability with reformist ambition in a complex international environment. The success of this new course will depend not only on the strength of the mandate itself, but above all on the ability to translate it into credible, sustainable, and broadly shared reforms—avoiding choices misaligned with domestic institutional constraints and regional strategic balances.
