Mauritania
Revolutionary fervor and rhetoric are not enough to solve the financial problems AES member countries are facing in the Sahel. For this reason, the transitional governments of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are exploring alternative sources of financing. Mali and Burkina Faso, in particular, are gauging the possibility of joining the BRICS and have signaled this intention to Russia. Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop expressed Bamako’s interest in joining the bloc of emerging economies in an interview with the Russian agency “Novosti,” though he noted that no formal application has been submitted. Later, Burkina Faso’s Prime Minister, Kyelem de Tambela, expressed a similar intent to the Russian ambassador to Ouagadougou, Igor Martynov, stating that joining BRICS could help “counter the dominance of the dollar and euro” and promote “fairer international trade.” However, these declarations appear more as expressions of hope, or perhaps excessive optimism, regarding BRICS, primarily driven by AES countries’ desire for increased international prestige and strengthened cooperation, particularly in financing, a goal that may remain unmet.
At the same time, AES countries are adopting alternative financing strategies, such as exerting pressure on mining companies. A case in point is the temporary detention of some employees of the Canadian mining company Barrick Gold. Malian authorities did not publicly disclose reasons for the detention, which was resolved through confidential negotiations between the government and the company. Barrick Gold had previously criticized the new mining code introduced by the transitional government, allowing the state to claim up to 30% of the revenues from mining projects. Barrick Gold holds 80% of the companies that operate the Loulo-Gounkoto mining complex, near the Senegalese border, and had already reported divergences with the government. The Barrick Gold case illustrates Mali’s need to secure liquidity, a need shared by the governments of Niger and Burkina Faso, which are also dealing with debts incurred by Bamako to fund basic services and pay for the Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group) services.
Chad, on the other hand, has taken a smoother path toward stabilizing public debt with the support of the UAE. The government of N'Djamena secured a loan of 300 billion CFA francs (about $500 million) from the Abu Dhabi Development Fund. Chadian President Mahamat Déby announced the deal after a trip to the UAE, where he met President Mohammed bin Zayed. This loan, one of the largest in Chad's history, represents 15% of the national budget for 2024 and comes with particularly favorable terms, including a 1% interest rate and a 14-year duration. This financing underscores Chad's strategic importance to the UAE and rewards the debt-reduction strategy pursued by Déby's government, centered on joining the G20’s Common Framework, which has already led to a significant reduction in N'Djamena's public debt. It remains to be seen how effectively the Chadian government will utilize this loan. N'Djamena’s plan is ambitious, with key infrastructure development and improvements to basic services, but the risks of corruption and administrative inefficiencies could undermine long-term success.
On the front of armed insurgency, this month saw an interview with Hamadoun Kouffa, one of the leaders of JNIM and head of the Macina katiba, a brigade of the al-Qaeda-linked group mainly composed of Peul members. Kouffa’s remarks highlight significant shifts in insurgency dynamics over the past year. First, the crackdown by the transitional government and the Wagner Group has driven parts of the population to support JNIM, particularly in central and northern Mali. Kouffa also indicated that JNIM is expanding its actions towards West African coastal countries, notably Ghana, Togo, and Benin. Kouffa stated that JNIM is open to negotiations with Sahel governments and “anyone who wishes,” clarifying, however, that the application of Sharia remains a fundamental requirement for the group. His statements reflect the worsening of the insurgency, now unfolding on two fronts: in the center, where jihadist groups are fighting the Bamako government and Russian mercenaries, and in the north, where Tuareg armed groups have already repelled two government offensives.
Download the October 2024 report
Med-Or Foundation’s Memorandum of Understanding with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania will cover cooperation in higher education and cultural heritage conservation
The event, organized by Med-Or Foundation in collaboration with the Mauritanian Ministry of Culture and the Mauritanian Embassy in Italy, took place on Thursday 23 March in Rome at the MAXXI auditorium
| Head of state | Mohamed Cheikh El Ghazouani |
| Head of Government | Mohamed Ould Bilal |
| Institutional Form | Unitary semi-presidential Islamic republic |
| Capital | Nouakchott |
| Legislative Power | Unicameral Parliament or Barlamane (Narional Assembly or Al Jamiya Al Wataniya, 157 Members every 5 years) |
| Judicial Power | Supreme Court (divided into 7 Houses: 2 Civil Houses, 2 Labour Houses, 1 Commercial House, 1 Administrative House and 1 penal House. Each House has one President and two Councillors); Constitutional Council (6 Members) |
| Ambassador to Italy | Mohamed Mahmoud Dahi |
| Total Area kmq | 1.030.700 km2 |
| Land | 1.030.700 km2 |
| Weather | Desert, hot, dry and dusty |
| Natural resources | Iron, gypsum, copper, phosphate, diamonds, gold, oil and fishing |
| Economic summary | The economy is based on the extractive industries, fishing, animal husbandry, agriculture, and services. Recent GDP growth depends on foreign investments in the mining and oil sectors; half the population depends on agriculture and livestock farming |
| GDP | $8.23 billion (Dec. 2021) |
| Pro-capite GDP (Purchasing power parity) | $1544 (Dec. 2021) |
| Exports | $3.7 billion (2020) |
| Export partner | China 33.9%, Switzerland 15.2%, Spain 8.27%, Canada 7.67%, Japan 5.66%, Italy 3.71% (2020) |
| Imports | $3.41 billion (2020) |
| Import partner | China 22.2%, France 7.93%, UAE 6.73%, Morocco 5.55%, Spain 4.68%, United States 3.96%, Brazil 3.3% (2020) |
| Trade With Italy | $ 241,56 million (2021) |
| Population | 4.161.925 (2022) |
| Population Growth | 1,99% (2022 est.) |
| Ethnicities | Black Mauri (Haratines) 40%, White Mauri (Beydane) 30%, Sub-Saharan Mauritanians (including Halpulaar, Fulani, Soninke, Wolof, Bambara ethnic groups) 30% |
| Languages | Arabic (official and national), Pular, Soninke, Wolof (all national languages), French |
| Religions | Muslim (official): 100% Islamic |
| Urbanization | 56,9 % (2022) |
| Literacy | 53.5% |
Independent since 1958, the West African state of Mauritania borders with Western Sahara to the north, Algeria to the northeast, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, Senegal to the south and Mali to the east. The population is estimated to be 4.4 million, divided into six ethnic groups. The official language is Arabic.
Thanks to its off-centre geographical position in relation to the Sahel crisis, Mauritania today enjoys a good level of political stability. Despite this and the presence of natural and energy resources, the country has not yet achieved a sustained economic growth. Its proximity to Western Sahara to the north, combined with its economic potential, make Mauritania a key country in the geopolitical balances of the Broader Mediterranean region.
Trade between Italy and Mauritania is growing. Since 2018, Italian private companies have begun to explore business opportunities in the local market, and in 2020 the value of trade between the two countries increased by 12 percent. In 2021 the trade between the two countries reached $ 241,56 million. Italian exports to Mauritania mainly consist of agricultural and industrial machinery, while imports include energy and fish products. Italy has also launched a wide range of initiatives in the humanitarian sphere as well as in security cooperation.
