Back to Insights
How Japan’s FOIP Vision Is Evolving
Ten years after the launch of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japan under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is updating the vision’s instruments without altering its principles, placing greater emphasis on resilience, economic security and strategic infrastructure.
When Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi met Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in Rome last week, the discussions extended well beyond the bilateral relationship. According to reports, Takaichi sought Italy’s support in helping promote across Europe the updated version of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), the vision through which Tokyo increasingly interprets the transformations reshaping the international order.
The request reflects a broader effort by Japanese diplomacy. Ten years after Shinzo Abe launched FOIP, Tokyo is seeking to update that vision without altering its foundational principles, adapting it to an international environment that it views as more competitive, fragmented and vulnerable than in the past. The central question is therefore how Japan is recalibrating the existing FOIP framework to respond to these new conditions.
The updated vision was formally unveiled by Takaichi in Hanoi, Vietnam, on 2 May, marking the tenth anniversary of FOIP’s launch. The choice of venue was far from incidental. Vietnam has emerged as one of Japan’s most important partners in Southeast Asia and embodies many of the priorities that increasingly shape Tokyo’s regional engagement: economic security, industrial resilience, the protection of maritime routes and the reduction of strategic vulnerabilities.
To understand the significance of this evolution, it is worth recalling how FOIP first emerged. When Abe introduced the concept in 2016, Japan was increasingly concerned about China’s growing influence and about the future of maritime security and the rules-based international order. The objective was to promote a regional environment grounded in freedom of navigation, connectivity, respect for international law and economic cooperation.
From the outset, however, Tokyo deliberately avoided presenting FOIP as a containment strategy. Instead, it was framed as an open and inclusive vision, compatible with the desire of many ASEAN member states to maintain constructive relations with all major powers. This sensitivity to Southeast Asian preferences remains one of the defining characteristics of FOIP today.
Its geographical breadth is not entirely new either. Abe first articulated FOIP in Nairobi, Kenya, where he described the Indian Ocean as the connective space linking Asia and Africa and outlined a vision capable of bringing together the Pacific and Indian Oceans within a broader framework of prosperity, freedom and openness. In that sense, the idea of a wider space connecting Asia and Africa was already embedded in FOIP’s original conception.
What is changing today concerns primarily the substance of the cooperation that Japan seeks to promote across that space. While the original vision focused largely on freedom of navigation, the rule of law and connectivity, the update presented by Takaichi places far greater emphasis on economic, technological and industrial resilience.
Indeed, resilience is the concept that runs throughout the updated framework. From Tokyo’s perspective, the transformations of recent years have demonstrated that principles such as freedom, openness, inclusiveness and the rule of law remain essential, but are no longer sufficient on their own to guarantee a free and open Indo-Pacific. Wars, economic coercion, energy vulnerabilities, supply-chain disruptions, cyber threats and technological competition have broadened the meaning of security itself.
Against this backdrop, FOIP is increasingly presented as a comprehensive instrument designed to strengthen countries’ ability to preserve strategic autonomy in an environment characterised by growing interdependence. Resilience thus becomes the operational complement to the principles that have defined the vision since its inception.
To translate this approach into practice, the Japanese government has identified three principal pillars.
The first concerns the development of economic infrastructure for the age of artificial intelligence and data. In Tokyo’s conception, infrastructure no longer consists solely of ports, roads and railways. It now encompasses submarine cables, data centres, telecommunications networks, computing capacity, semiconductors, quantum technologies and artificial intelligence systems. Within this framework, Japan is advancing what it describes as a “FOIP Digital Corridor”, intended to strengthen digital connectivity and technological cooperation across the broader Indo-Pacific.
Closely linked to this objective is the strengthening of supply-chain resilience. Energy resources, rare earths, critical minerals and pharmaceutical products are increasingly viewed as strategic assets. Through initiatives such as POWERR Asia, Tokyo aims to enhance regional energy security and reduce vulnerabilities associated with disruptions to critical supplies.
The second pillar focuses on economic growth and the promotion of shared rules. Japan intends to mobilise the private sector to support investment, create economic opportunities and contribute to the development of new markets across partner countries. In this context, major Japanese industrial and trading companies play a central role, alongside frameworks such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which Tokyo views as an important mechanism for promoting high-standard rules governing trade and investment.
The third pillar concerns security cooperation. Here too, Japan’s approach has broadened considerably. Beyond maritime cooperation, the updated framework emphasises surveillance capabilities, cybersecurity, maritime domain awareness and security-assistance programmes. This evolution is reflected in the expansion of Official Security Assistance (OSA) and the growing coordination between OSA and Official Development Assistance (ODA).
The emphasis placed on these practical initiatives is not accidental. The updated FOIP suggests that Tokyo increasingly sees the need to demonstrate the tangible benefits of cooperation rather than relying exclusively on the appeal of abstract principles. Submarine cables, digital infrastructure, energy security, cyber capabilities and resilient supply chains are not simply sectoral priorities; they are the instruments through which Japan seeks to make FOIP a concrete and attractive proposition for regional partners.
This approach is particularly significant in Southeast Asia, where many governments continue to avoid rigid alignment between competing major powers. For that reason, Tokyo consistently describes FOIP as an inclusive vision rather than a framework intended to impose geopolitical choices or exclude specific actors.
It is within this broader context that Japan’s engagement with Italy acquires additional significance. For Tokyo, Rome has emerged as one of the European partners with which it shares growing convergence on issues such as economic security, critical infrastructure, advanced technologies, energy security and industrial resilience. The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) is perhaps the most visible manifestation of this trend. More broadly, Takaichi’s request for Italian support suggests that Japan is seeking partners capable of translating FOIP into a language that resonates beyond Asia.
The timing of this diplomatic effort also coincides with a broader debate over the future of the Indo-Pacific concept itself. In recent days, the Trump administration decided to restore the historic designation of U.S. Pacific Command, replacing the term Indo-Pacific Command adopted in 2018. Washington insists that neither the command’s mission nor its area of responsibility is changing. Nevertheless, the decision has reopened discussion about the political significance of the Indo-Pacific concept and the role it will continue to play in international strategic discourse.
For Tokyo, however, the direction appears increasingly clear. The updated FOIP does not represent a departure from the vision originally articulated by Abe, nor does it fundamentally redefine its geographical scope. Rather, it reflects Japan’s conviction that preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific now requires greater attention to economic resilience, technological connectivity, supply-chain security and practical cooperation among partners. The effort to engage countries such as Italy also points to Japan’s ambition to move beyond the strictly Indo-Pacific dimension of FOIP, fostering broader support for a vision that it considers increasingly relevant in an international system defined by shared vulnerabilities and deepening interdependence.
